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Abstract 
In October 1951 John McAteer, who had been selected by the Irish Trade Union 
Congress (ITUC) as a member of a team that was to visit the United States under the 
auspices of Ireland’s Marshall Aid Technical Assistance (TA) programme, had his 
application for an entry visa rejected. This paper examines this episode of Ireland’s 
Marshall Plan participation experience drawing upon files in the Irish National 
Archives. It begins by tracing the difficulties the 1945 split between rival Irish trade 
union congresses created for efforts to foster joint employer-trade union action within 
Ireland’s Marshall Aid TA programme. It then turns to the manner in which one of the 
union congresses, the ITUC, selected the members of its team to visit the USA and the 
issues raised by the selection for part of its own support base as well as for agencies of 
the Irish and US governments involved in Marshall Aid administration. Once 
McAteer had been refused a visa the ITUC decided to combine protest at his 
exclusion with continued participation in the TA project despite internal demands that 
it withdraw entirely.  Briefing of the press by ITUC officers may have been 
responsible for press coverage that suggested that the Stormont government was to 
blame for the US attitude towards McAteer. No evidence to support such a contention 
has been found in the Irish National Archives files examined. 
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 Introduction 
John McAteer was a relatively unobtrusive, though far from insignificant, mid-
twentieth century Irish trade union figure.  In one of the labour history literature’s 
fairly rare references to him Terry Cradden (1993: 198) writes that `McAteer’s years 
of hard work’ in the roles of official of the National Union of Printing, Bookbinding 
and Paper Workers, of Secretary of Belfast and District Trades Union Council and of 
Secretary of the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Trade Union Congress 
(ITUC) `were eventually recompensed by his election as President of Congress in 
1953’. But a footnote states that McAteer’s election to this office was less a 
recognition of this long service than something that came about `by way of a 
consolation prize’ for one brief and atypical episode of his career: 
McAteer was one of six ITUC nominees for a visit to the US under the auspices 
of the [Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA)] in 1952. The story is a 
rather tortuous one, but he was refused a visa and there seem to have been 
three factors at work: first, that he was a known left-winger; second, that he 
was not a `national’ of the country sending the mission; and third, that 
Stormont had intervened against his application. In any case, the team went 
without him, much to the ire of McAteer’s northern supporters (Cradden 1993: 
212) 
The aim of this paper is to draw on material in the Irish National Archives (both 
government department files and the ITUC records that have been deposited there) 
in order to more fully reconstruct this `rather tortuous’ story.  The context of the 
Productivity and Technical Assistance component of Marshall Aid programme within 
which proposals to send Irish employers and trade unionists on team visits to the 
USA were initiated and the difficulties these encountered due to the existence since 
1945 of two rival trade union congresses in Ireland are first sketched. The manner in 
which the ITUC selected its team members and the controversies to which that 
selection gave rise is next described. The manner in which John MaAteer’s 
membership of this team was constructed as being problematical through private 
exchanges between the Irish government and the US Embassy in Dublin as well as 
discussions within the Department of Industry and Commerce is then examined. 
Finally, the manner in which various actors reacted when the denial of a visa to 
McAteer became public knowledge is considered.  
 Productivity and Technical Assistance as a component of Marshall Aid 
Along with dollar grants or loans for commodity purchases, Marshall Aid 
encompassed a Technical Assistance and Productivity Programme (USTAP). 
Technical Assistance (TA) primarily took the forms of individuals or teams visiting 
the USA to study the state of their particular art in a US context (Type A TA) or of 
US consultants visiting Europe to carry out analysis and dispense advice (Type B 
TA). Aid recipients were also urged by ECA to set up national productivity centres in 
which government, business and trade unions would collaborate on a benefit-sharing 
basis to promote the dissemination of changes that would assist in bridging the 
performance gap between the European and the US economies (Murray 2009: 19-45). 
ECA Missions to individual aid recipient states frequently encountered division 
between `free’ and `red’ trade unions and it was a key objective of USTAP to 
strengthen the former and marginalise the latter. What to do when, as in the Irish case, 
the trade union movement was deeply divided and anti-communist unions unwilling 
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to co-operate with one another were found on both sides of the divide was less 
obvious.  
Irish trade union congress and Labour Party splits of the 1940s 
The Irish Trade Union Congress, established in 1894, continued to operate on an all-
Ireland basis after the island’s political partition at the beginning of the 1920s. But, 
with its affiliated unions organised on divergent local, Irish or British Isles lines, it 
experienced growing internal tensions. While the strongly nationalist Irish Transport 
and General Workers Union (ITGWU) was the main beneficiary of explosive 
membership growth during and after the First World War, a significant British Isles 
general workers union presence was also established around this time in the shape 
of the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union (ATGWU). The situation 
regarding large general unions was further complicated when, after a decade in the 
USA, James Larkin, the ITGWU leader in its early years, returned to Ireland in 1923 
where he clashed with the new leadership dominated by William O’Brien and formed 
the breakaway Workers Union of Ireland (WUI). Among the smaller and/or more 
specialised unions the struggle for political independence was accompanied by a 
wave of Irish breakaways from amalgamated unions with British headquarters. The 
proportion of the membership breaking away varied but in most cases the 
breakaway and the original organisation were to be found co-existing in a less than 
amicable fashion, although the investment in enmity appears to have been 
considerably greater among union officials than among the rank and file (Hannigan 
1981).   
After plummeting during the 1920s, union membership recovered against the 
backdrop of industrialisation behind high tariff walls in the 1930s. As it did so, the 
Fianna Fail government signalled to the ITUC its intent to legislate if internal reform 
measures to tackle a perceived state of irrational fragmentation and internecine 
conflict were not forthcoming. An ITUC commission of inquiry was set up but no 
agreed basis for proceeding was found.  Stalemate on the issue of reorganisation left 
the ITUC on the brink of a split in 1939 when an `advisory’ Council of Irish Unions was 
formed with the ITGWU at its core. The first year of neutral Ireland’s Emergency was 
marked by an upsurge in industrial disputes. Proposals to severely restrict the right 
to strike formed the initial government response but, with a growing closeness 
between ITGWU leaders and Fianna Fail Ministers for Industry and Commerce as its 
context, the focus moved towards trade union rationalisation. Here the emphasis 
was initially on tackling the multiplicity of unions by eliminating smaller ones but 
over time this shifted to excluding unions with British headquarters. In its final form 
the Act passed in 1941 discriminated against such unions in a number of ways, the 
most crucial of which related to a tribunal given power to award the sole right to 
organise a particular class of workers to a specific union (McCarthy 1977 202-206) 
Internal division and behind-the-scenes collusion by some of their number with the 
government prevented the trade unions becoming an effective vehicle for popular 
protest in the early years of neutral Ireland’s Emergency. Within ITUC pre-existing 
strains were exacerbated by the strong union membership growth that wartime 
conditions stimulated north of the border and the active involvement in the congress 
that the mainly British-based union beneficiaries of this growth exhibited. By 1944 
these British-based unions had a majority on the ITUC Executive and early in 1945 
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the Congress finally divided over attendance at a world trade union conference being 
hosted in London by the British TUC. For the ITGWU and a number of smaller Irish 
unions attendance was incompatible with Ireland’s neutrality and they withdrew to 
form the Congress of Irish Unions (CIU) when the sending of a delegation was 
approved. The Fianna Fail government’s policy after the split in congress was that `to 
build up the prestige of the Congress of Irish Unions and to treat it as the more 
representative organ of Trade Union opinion’i. 
Within the field of party politics active campaigning against the hardship and 
inequity of Fianna Fail’s emergency regime (O’Drisceoil 2005: 264-267) revitalised 
and radicalised a Labour Party, which, like the ITUC, experienced a major shift in its 
internal balance of forces during the Emergency years. Rapid expansion and a new 
activism had loosened the grip on the party’s structures long held by the largest 
general workers union in the state, the ITGWU. This enabled both James Larkin 
senior and James Larkin junior to join the party and stand successfully as Dail 
candidates in the 1943 general election. Industrially Larkin senior had been the 
bitterly detested enemy of the ITGWU leadership for the two decades since the 
power struggle that ended in the WUI breakaway. Politically both Larkins had – albeit 
in somewhat different ways - been identified with Communism and its hostility to 
the Labour Party over the same period although both now claimed to have severed 
their communist connections and professed a willingness to work amicably with 
former enemies within the Labour Party fold. Labour’s leader William Norton seems 
to have calculated that the ITGWU would not act on its threats and that a party with 
a broadened base could be sustained despite the bitterness of trade union rivalries. 
However, as noted above, the industrial politics of the Emergency period had seen 
an alliance forged behind the scenes between Fianna Fail ministers and ITGWU 
leaders. Alleging communist penetration of the Labour Party, most ITGWU-linked 
TDs left to form the National Labour Party in early 1944. The split saw Labour in 
disarray when a snap general election in called in May 1944. Here the Fianna Fail 
government was also able to capitalise on a number of other issues – the “American 
Note” episode, the introduction of children’s allowance payments (Girvin 2006: 248-
255) - to successfully restore the overall Dail majority it had lost in the previous 
year’s election. The Labour vote fell sharply. Eight Labour and four National Labour 
TDs were returned compared with the seventeen seats the united party had held 
after the 1943 election. 
While ministerial powers of nomination were used to appoint CIU adherents and 
exclude ITUC ones when the opportunity arose, a Supreme Court decision that the 
key tribunal provisions of the 1941 Trade Union Act were unconstitutional 
subsequently denied the ITGWU and its satellites the really substantive membership 
gain benefits they might have expected to derive from alignment with Fianna Fail. 
When the governing party lost its overall majority in the 1948 general election, 
National Labour TDs defied CIU instructions and opted to join four other opposition 
parties –including the Labour Party -  in forming a new government rather than 
backing a continuation of the outgoing one (Puirseil 2007: 130-131). Southern 
Ireland’s tiny number of Communists facilitated Labour Party reunification (which 
took place in 1950) by abandoning the Labour Party entryism they had practiced 
since the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and launching a new party that omitted 
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the word Communist from its title. Inaugurating the Irish Workers League in October 
1948, Spanish Civil War veteran and Emergency internee Michael O’Riordan declared 
that:  
The politicians are talking about the country entering into military alliances if a 
deal can be done about partition. Already we have been committed to the 
Marshall Plan and are witnessing the humiliation of having a commission in our 
midst from a foreign country with power to interfere in our internal economic 
affairs. Ireland is being lined up in the Anglo-U.S. Imperialistic camp in 
opposition to those countries which have ended the privileges and power of 
their wealthy classes, but the Irish people must make it clear to the politicians 
that they want no part of the Imperialist war plans and have no quarrel with 
these countries which are building a social system along the Socialist lines 
James Connolly envisaged for Ireland.ii  
Despite the death of James Larkin Senior and the retirement of William O’Brien in 
the late 1940s, trade union division was to prove more intractable than that within 
the Labour Party. The tortuous process of reuniting the two union congresses was 
not to be completed until 1959 formation of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
(ICTU).   
The Union Congresses and Ireland’s Technical Assistance Programme 
The first Marshall Aid Irish TA projects got under way in 1949 and by the second half 
of 1950 Ireland’s two rival trade union congresses were engaged in discussions with 
the Department of Industry and Commerce about visiting the USA alongside the 
Federated Union of Employers (FUE). By early 1951, however, an impasse had 
emerged. The Irish government and the Dublin ECA Mission both favoured a single 
mission consisting of four FUE nominees, two ITUC nominees and two nominees 
from the Congress of Irish Unions (CIU). But this was unacceptable to the CIU who 
set out their grounds of objection on 20 April in a letter to the ECA Mission. 
According to the CIU `the present government and its predecessor have recognized 
this Congress as the most representative central trade union authority by affording us 
the representation of the workers of Ireland at the International Labour Organization 
Annual Meetings’.  The letter went to assert that most of the ITUC membership was 
located in Northern Ireland `and would, it is presumed, participate in Technical 
Assistance teams from Britain under ECA’ while at least two-thirds of industrial 
workers in Republic were CIU union members.  But, until it was ejected from office 
in June, the first Inter-Party Government was unwilling to move away from the model 
of a single team based on a 4-2-2 formula and the impasse continued. 
With Fianna Fail having returned to office in June 1951 the idea of sending two larger 
teams immediately found favour.  Formally the CIU and FUE nominees would 
together comprise one team and the ITUC nominees on their own another. But, with 
the two teams travelling at the same time, it was envisaged that arrangements could be 
made for both sets of trade union nominees to participate in joint activities with the 
FUE representatives while in the United States. By 21 June Industry and Commerce 
wrote to both congresses seeking six team member nominees from each. The dollar 
costs of the teams’ visits were to be borne by the US technical assistance programme: 
the non-dollar costs (principally travel to the USA) were to be shared equally between 
the Irish exchequer and the participating business or trade union bodies.
iii
  
Translated into round figures, as the ITUC Secretary informed the affiliated unions 
with representation on the National Executive who were invited to put forward 
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nominations for team membership, this meant that a union would have to commit 
itself to paying approximately £120 should its nominee be chosen as a participant.  
The ITUC set 18 July as the deadline for the receipt of nominations with the 
Executive meeting to select participants on 20 July. By this date only two nominations 
had been received – Norman Kennedy by the ATGWU and John McAteer by the 
National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers (NUPBBW). Nine 
unions had declined to make nominations and a further three had indicated that they 
could not reach a decision on the matter within the time allowed.
iv
 At the 20 July 
meeting Kennedy and McAteer were selected as team members as was the ITUC’s 
Secretary, Ruaidhri Roberts.
v
 In addition all affiliated unions, rather than just those 
represented on the National Executive, were circularised inviting nominations 
accompanied by the requisite financial undertaking. When the National Executive met 
on 10 August it had a further five nominees from which to select the remaining three 
team members. The ATGWU had decided to make a second nomination and others 
had been received from the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), the National 
Union of Vehicle Builders (NUVB), the Irish Women Workers Union (IWWU) and 
the Irish National Teachers Organisation (INTO).
vi
 As Table 1 shows, two ballots 
were required as two candidates were for tied for the final team place at the end of the 
first one.
vii
 The selected team’s composition is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 1  Votes Cast at ITUC National Executive Meeting, 10 August 1951 
    
Nominating Union First Ballot Tie-Breaking Ballot 
NUR 10  
ATGWU 9  
NUVB 6 7 
IWWU 6 4 
INTO 2  
 
Table 2 Selected ITUC Team Members 
Name Union 
Richard Deasy NUR 
Sam Kyle  ATGWU 
Norman Kennedy ATGWU 
John McAteer NUPBBW 
Edward Mulligan NUVB 
Ruaidhri Roberts ITUC 
 
Adverse reactions to the ITUC team’s composition 
This outcome did not produce universal satisfaction. The Dublin United Trades 
Council on 28 August wrote to Roberts protesting `on the double ground that 
representation of women workers, and especially of ordinary workers at their trade, 
was most desirable in deputations of this kind’.  Roberts responded that `the selection 
of members of the team was made by the National Executive by a ballot vote, as it 
was the view of the Executive that this was the fairest method and most likely to give 
due weight to the many factors involved’. A longer draft for what was ultimately a 
brief response states that `consideration was given to the desirability of including a 
woman worker and workers at their trade, but these are only two of the many factors 
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that have to be taken into account and no special representations relating to these 
factors were received from any organisation prior to the selection meeting’. The draft 
also contained the argument that `two of the six representatives are workers at their 
trade and all the members have practical experience of working at their occupations 
prior to appointment as trade union officials. It is also relevant to point out that the 
study of American collective bargaining practices and trade union activities is one of 
the principal functions of this team and accordingly, that the team may be of greatest 
benefit to the trade union movement, it is not inappropriate that the majority of its 
members should be full-time official of trade unions’.viii   
Misgivings about the team’s membership were soon to extend beyond the trade 
union movement but outside its ranks these did not focus on the presence of two 
ATGWU representatives and the exclusion of the IWWU’s Miss Caffrey but rather on 
the position of John McAteer. On 4 September the Minister for External Affairs, 
Frank Aiken, received the following “Office Memorandum” from Cloyce K. Huston, 
Charge d’Affaires, Ad Interim of the US Embassy:  
Box 1 - Office Memorandum September 4, 1951 Subject: John McAteer, I.T.U.C. 
Nominee for Labor T.A. Projectix   
The Embassy has been informed that Mr. John McAteer has recently been 
nominated by the Irish Trade Union Congress as a member of the Labor team to visit 
the United States under the ECA Technical Assistance Program. McAteer is a 
member of the National Executive of the I.T.U.C. and is Secretary of the Northern 
Ireland Committee of the I.T.U.C. His trade union is the National Union of Printing, 
Bookbinding and Paper Workers, the Irish membership of which is exclusively in 
Northern Ireland. He resides in Belfast, and his only connection with the South of 
Ireland is through the I.T.U.C. He is a British subject. 
 In the circumstances ECA and other United States authorities concerned cannot 
permit McAteer’s participation in the T.A. project. It is technically impossible for ECA 
Dublin to permit a Northern Ireland trade unionist to be a member of a team 
financed as representing the Republic of Ireland. Although he is presumably a British 
subject, his possession of an Irish passport would not remove the technical obstacle.  
The Embassy will accordingly inform the Irish Department of External Affairs that 
McAteer’s participation in the proposed team cannot be accepted, making sure that 
the appropriate Irish authorities fully understand and appreciate the circumstances 
necessitating this decision.” 
A second meeting on the matter between Aiken and Huston took place on 6 
September. The External Affairs note on the meetings records Huston as adding that 
`even if a visa were to be granted, McAteer would scarcely be allowed to participate 
in the ECA project because his record or reputation (from the American standpoint) 
might raise criticism in Congress circles at the present time’. Handwritten notes on 
the document initialled FA record that `on 4th his record was “derogatory”’ and 
`Congress argument on 6th’. The External Affairs response to the US memorandum 
made clear its objection to a general line of argument which `seems to represent an 
endorsement of partition’: 
While we recognise, of course, the fact that the United States authorities are 
exclusively entitled to grant or refuse visas to enter their territory and do not 
seek to influence the exercise of their absolute discretion in regard to 
McAteer’s case, we cannot be taken as acquiescing in a view that `a Northern 
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Ireland trade unionist may not be a member of a team financed as 
representing the Republic of Ireland’. This view represents so far as we are 
concerned an entirely unacceptable endorsement of the iniquitous situation 
which has obtained here since the British Government divided our nation in 
two and imposed their nationality upon a large number of Irish people who 
want to be recognised solely as Irish citizens.  
At his meeting with Huston on 6 September Aiken emphasised the practical 
difficulties he might face in the Dail if McAteer’s exclusion was linked to his being a 
British subject and a Belfast resident – `on the other hand, the Minister considered it 
quite possible to convince the Dail that the U.S. authorities have exclusive discretion 
to refuse the entry of any foreigner to their jurisdiction without giving any reasons 
whatever’. With regard to the proposed visa refusal having any substantial political 
or national security grounds, Aiken and his officials were frankly sceptical: 
 
So far as we knew, McAteer has had a clean security record for a number of 
years back and our police expressed the view that he should be granted a 
passport. In this connection the Minister expressed the view that in all 
probability McAteer, if permitted to accompany his five fellow delegates to 
America, would find himself so hustled around that, even if he wanted to, he 
could scarcely indulge in any undesirable activities. 
 
Returning in conclusion to the issue of whether McAteer was to be regarded as 
British or Irish, `the Minister remarked that it was more than likely that many dual 
nationals had already visited America on E.C.A. schemes’.x 
  
On the day of the second meeting between Aiken and Huston, Miss Brewster of the 
Department of Industry and Commerce’s Labour Division was writing a report on the 
progress made to date towards sending the two teams to the USA. In it she 
highlighted the position of John McAteer in broadly similar terms to those of the US 
Embassy memorandum noting that his union `has no negotiating licence under our 
Trade Union Act and appears to operate solely in the Six-County area’:  
 
It is for consideration whether we should allow Mr. McAteer to participate in 
this mission as a representative of the T.U.C. when the Union of which he is an 
official does not operate in the State. So far we have not interfered at all in the 
Congresses’ selections, and it may well be argued that Twenty-Six County trade 
unionism will benefit as a result of the participation of Mr. McAteer as a 
member of the [ITUC National] Executive. On the other hand, objections may 
be raised to the State’s financing his participation when he belongs to a union 
that does not operate here. The extent of the State’s financial contribution will 
be approximately £120 (50% of the return fare from Ireland to the States). Any 
information gained on this trip will no doubt be through the Unions as well as 
through the Congresses and it may be thought that Mr. McAteer is blocking a 
place on the mission which might be filled by an official of a union with 
substantial membership here.xi 
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Further up the Department’s hierarchy, however, there was no inclination to engage 
in such consideration and when McAteer’s nomination as a team member was 
discussed at the regular departmental conference on 10 September a decision was 
taken that no objection should be raised.xii   There is no evidence of Industry and 
Commerce being made aware by External Affairs of the discussions that had taken 
place between that department and the US Embassy on the subject of McAteer’s 
visa. Prompted by the NUR nominee to the team, Ruaidhri Roberts during 
September raised with both of  these departments the question of `whether official 
passports will be issued to the members of the team or whether the members of the 
team will travel on their own passports and make personal application for their visa 
to the U.S. Embassy’. External Affairs informed him that `official passports had been 
issued to certain E.C.A. Technical Assistance teams, but in such cases application is 
made originally from the Department of Industry and Commerce’.  When he then 
sought clarification from Industry and Commerce, Roberts was told that `it is not 
intended to issue official passports to the participants in this Mission. Application for 
passports and visa should be made by the members of the Mission themselves.’xiii 
Clearly the potential for political complication was much greater in a case of the 
refusal of a visa to an official passport holder than in the case of a refusal to the 
holder of a private individual’s passport. The External Affairs note responding to US 
Embassy memorandum states that `for the purpose of a journey to the United 
States, as member of an E.C.A. T.A. Program labor team, McAteer would be entitled 
to the gratis issue of an “official” passport, valid for the duration of the particular 
programme in contemplation’xiv. However there is no evidence that Industry and 
Commerce had any communication with External Affairs on whether or not the ITUC 
team members should receive official passports – it seems to have made its decision 
by a purely internal process.   
 
The ITUC response to the refusal of a US visa to a member of its selected team 
 
Formal communication of the refusal of a visa to McAteer came on 18 October, 
exactly a month after Industry and Commerce’s statement of its position on the 
provision of official passports to the team of which he was a member.  This avoided 
stating any specific ground – `we find that, under the conditions governing the 
issuance of visas, we will be unable to accept the application of Mr. John McAteer’ – 
and invited the nomination of a substitute team member.xv 0n 26 October this was 
passed on, via Industry and Commerce, to the ITUC whose National Executive 
debated the matter at a special meeting on 9 November. Before the meeting was a 
motion calling for `the decision to send a team to the U.S.A. to be rescinded and that 
the National Executive have nothing further to do with any such proposal’. The 
meeting’s minutes provide the following summary of the ensuing debate:  
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In the course of further discussion members speaking against the motion made 
the following points: that the possibility of Mr. McAteer’s exclusion because he 
was a resident in Northern Ireland and considered to be a United Kingdom 
citizen had been visualised when the team was being appointed, that the terms 
under which the team members were nominated was a matter for the United 
States and that diplomatic problems were involved that could not be resolved by 
any action by the National Executive, that the withdrawal of the whole team 
would receive widespread publicity and might involve misinterpretations which 
would be very damaging to the Irish T.U.C.  and that members of the team had 
undertaken personal expenditure in making preparations for the visit. 
For the motion it was stated that no conditions were made as to the membership 
of the team when the matter was first proposed, that the Northern Ireland 
Committee had protested to the Northern Ireland Government against their 
“hand-picking” of Labour representatives, that if any undesirable publicity was 
directed against the Irish T.U.C. as a consequence of their withdrawal such 
undesirable publicity would be equally directed against Mr. McAteer personally 
and in his capacity as a member of the National Executive if the National 
Executive agreed to his exclusion and that Mr. McAteer as well as other 
members of the team had undertaken personal expenditure.  
 
At the end of the debate the vote was tied with seven for and seven against. Rather 
than using his casting vote, the Chairman, James Larkin Junior, then sought `to 
explore the possibility of reaching a more substantial agreement between the 
members of the Executive’. What emerged from this exploration was agreement 
`that the team consisting of the five existing members should go to the U.S.A., that 
the vacancy caused by the withdrawal of Mr. McAteer should not be filled and that 
in notifying the Department of Industry and Commerce of this decision, the 
Department should also be asked to convey to the U.S. authorities a protest by the 
National Executive against the exclusion of Mr. McAteer’xvi. The letter sent to 
Industry and Commerce stated that `the Irish Trade Union Congress represents 
workers in the whole of the thirty-two counties of Ireland and accordingly they cannot 
appreciate the reason for any exception being made in the case of the Secretary of our 
Northern Ireland Committee’xvii.  
 
The National Executive was itself the target of protests with eighteen communications 
from a variety of trade union bodies being received over the three months following 
its decision. All but one of these came from Northern Ireland – the Dublin United 
Trades Council was the sole voice of southern dissent. All but one called for no team 
to go without McAteer – the one exception was that from the National Union of 
Distributive and Allied Workers, Rathkenny (Co. Antrim) Branch. This called for a 
new northern member to be nominated in McAteer’s stead. The reply this branch 
received informed it that it was not possible to appoint such a substitute as `no 
guaranteed nomination was received in respect of any person from Northern Ireland 
other than Mr. McAteer’xviii. Meeting on 16 November the Northern Ireland 
Committee of ITUC unanimously adopted a resolution calling for `further 
consideration’ of the National Executive decision to send a team in the light of 
northern trade union feeling about McAteer’s exclusion. But on 30 November the 
National Executive resolved that `the decision of the special meeting on this matter 
should stand’, a position it adhered to throughout the period of protestsxix. 
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Press coverage of the visa refusal 
 
The affair did not attract press coverage until after the 9 November meeting of the 
ITUC National Executive. Beginning by reporting the visa refusal and the ITUC 
protest against it, an Irish Times piece on 10 November then rehearsed McAteer’s 
trade union record before stating that: 
 
He sided with those who favour an all-Ireland Labour Party and was a strong 
supporter of Mr. Jack Beattie in the recent election in Belfast, and was a 
member of the committee that urged the reprieve of six young Belfastmen who 
were condemned to death in 1944. He was also a member of the 1798 
anniversary celebrations and is a brother of Mr. Sandy McAteer who was 
arrested and imprisoned in 1945 during a strike in Belfast. 
 
 The Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Trade Union Congress of which 
Mr. McAteer is Secretary, has been conducting a campaign in recent months to 
secure recognition from the Northern Ireland Government but the Government 
has told the committee that recognition would be given only if they severed 
their connection with the T.U.C. in Dublin. 
 
 These `activities and associations of Mr McAteer’, the piece continued, `were given 
last night by some trade unionists as possible reasons for the refusal of the visa’. To 
these trade unionists was then attributed `the addition factor that Northern Ireland was 
still diplomatically a part of the United Kingdom and as the delegation was sponsored 
by the Irish Government that a difficulty may have arisen in that field’xx. A shorter 
piece in the Irish Press on the same date did not attempt to identify the reason behind 
the refusal and in addition to his trade union offices noted only that McAteer was a 
member of the `Six-County Tourist Board’. Another Irish Press story on 12 
November reported that no official explanation for the refusal would be provided `as 
the State Department normally does not make public their reasons for such decisions’ 
but that `in Belfast it is believed that the U.S. attitude may have been dictated by Six-
County official reports on Mr. McAteer, who is prominently associated with the Anti-
Partition movement’xxi. On 11 November the Sunday Independent reported the story 
in very similar terms, making reference to McAteer’s trade union offices, his tourist 
board position, his all-Ireland Labour Party affiliation and his recent support for Jack 
Beattie: 
 
Mr. McAteer is well-known principally for his trade union activities, but his 
Nationalist sympathies have never been concealed. It was believed in Dublin 
last night that this may have influenced the U.S. authorities in arriving at their 
decision. The position was further complicated for the Americans, it is thought, 
by reason of the fact that Mr. McAteer, who is regarded for diplomatic purposes 
as a British citizen, was nominated as a member of an Irish delegation
xxii
. 
 
Further coverage of the story followed the 16 November meeting of the Northern 
Ireland Committee of ITUC. The Irish Press on the following day reported that, while 
no official statement was issued afterwards, it was understood that the committee 
had expressed the view... that no T.U.C. delegation should be sent to America 
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without Mr John McAteer, their secretary, being a member of it’. The report noted 
the presence of Ruaidhri Roberts at the meeting and indicated that the discussion of 
the matter had been lengthy. Protests from the Dublin and Belfast Trades Councils 
were referred to and, for the first time, information from a US government source 
made an appearance – `in Washington, a State Department spokesman stated that 
there was no record of the case in the Department and he assumed the visa had 
been refused by the U.S. Consul-General in Belfast. Only doubtful cases were 
referred to Washington, he added.’ The piece concluded by providing some 
biographical details of John McAteer – he was fifty years old, had served in the 
British Army during the First World War and lived in the Shankill Road district of 
Belfastxxiii.  
 
The Irish Independent of 17 November carried a similar story. Here the Northern 
Ireland Committee were reported to have `decided to lodge a protest against the 
refusal of the visa and support any movement by the Executive Committee of the 
Irish T.U.C. to cancel the visit unless Mr. McAteer is granted a visa’. It was also stated 
that the Belfast Trades Council were seeking a meeting with the U.S. Consul-
Generalxxiv. On November 30, the day on which the ITUC National Executive 
reaffirmed its position in the face of ongoing protests, the Irish Press reported that 
the U.S. Consul-General in Belfast, Ralph Bornstein, had declined to meet a Trades 
Council delegation – `Mr. Bornstein said that Mr. McAteer’s application did not go 
through the Belfast Consulate-General and, in any case, it was not usual practice to 
reveal reasons for refusal to persons other than the applicant’xxv. The role played by 
Dublin-based US Embassy or ECA Mission officials in the affair was not pursued by 
the press. No comment was elicited from the third party involved in the TA project 
from which McAteer was to be excluded, the Irish Government, nor from the fourth 
party associated with the affair by its press coverage, McAteer’s inferred traducer, 
the Northern Ireland Government. 
 
How was the publicity described above related to the actions of the various 
governmental and trade union parties involved in the TA project? ITUC officers were 
active in shaping its initial content. The Minutes of the National Executive meeting of 
30 November record that `following discussion of press reports which had been 
published the day after the special meeting [of the Executive on 9 November] it was 
agreed... that the action taken the President [James Larkin Junior] and the Secretary 
[Ruaidhri Roberts] in informing newspaper correspondents on the matter be 
approved’xxvi. Within Industry and Commerce Miss Brewster, in responding to the 
ITUC’s request that its protest be conveyed to the US authorities, on 14 November 
drafted a minute to External Affairs in which `I did not consider it wise to quote their 
remark on Mr. McAteer’s position as Secretary of the N.I. Committee since they have 
no case to send him in that capacity – if they had stressed his membership of the 
National Executive they might have had some case’. A handwritten addition to her 
memo refers to a press cutting – apparently from the Irish Times of 10 November – 
having subsequently come to hand and commenting that `in view of the life-history 
expounded therein I think it more than ever inadvisable to quote the T.U.C.’s 
remarks’. However her superior, Thomas Murray, opted to enclose a copy of the 
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ITUC’s letter with the minute sent to External Affairs adding that `your Department 
will, no doubt, convey the protest to the appropriate United States authorities’ and 
continuing that `the Congress has advised that their representatives will be ready to 
leave for America at any time during the first or second week in January and to 
request you to inform the E.C.A. accordingly’. On 20 November another Industry and 
Commerce officer recorded that: 
 
I told Mr. Roberts of the Irish Trade Union Congress that Mr Cavanaugh of the 
E.C.A. had told us that he had seen on the paper a note to the effect that the 
Northern branch of the Congress were so aggrieved at the refusal of the 
American authorities to give a visa to Mr. McAteer that the Branch had asked 
headquarters to take no part in the Mission. Mr. Cavanaugh had asked us to let 
him know as soon as possible whether the attitude of the Congress would be 
influenced by the protest made by the Northern Branch. Mr. Roberts said that 
all he could tell me officially was that a protest had been made and that it 
would be considered by the Executive at the next meeting, which would be on 
the 30th inst. He added that he could make no unofficial statement on the 
position and would make no guess as to what the position of the Executive 
would be. 
 
On 30 November Miss Brewster noted that `Mr. Roberts phoned me to inquire 
whether we had heard anything further as to the departure of the T.U.C. Mission for 
U.S.A. I said that we had not, but that we had sent on to D/Ext. Affairs their decision 
not to nominate anybody else in place of Mr. McAteer. I confirmed that we had 
neither got the impression ourselves, nor conveyed it to D.E.A. that the other five did 
not intend to go’. On 5 December an External Affairs officer wrote in a memo that 
`there are no grounds for formal protest as it is within the unqualified right of the US 
Government to act as it thinks fit in its own interests in the matter on the admittance 
of non US citizens to the US and I think that the most that we could do to meet the 
TUC here would be to convey to the ECA the latter’s disappointment and surprise at 
their unwillingness to facilitate Mr. McAteer. However this presumably is a matter to 
be decided by either by the Political and or the Protocol Division’.xxvii No further 
reference was found to the matter which may be presumed to have been overtaken by 
a series of larger events to which we now turn. 
November is a wicked month 
 
If both Irish and US governmental agencies had a clear interest in saying nothing 
publicly while proceeding with the business of moving forward a raft of TA projects, 
including the US visit of a now smaller than originally envisaged ITUC team, the 
passing up by the CIU of the opportunity presented by the McAteer visa refusal to 
sling mud at its its rival requires consideration given the rancorous atmosphere 
accompanying the split. Were any political doubts about John McAteer really green 
Irish nationalist rather than red communist or fellow-travelling ones? Did the 
inclusion in its team of a nominee of McAteer’s union – with its London headquarters, 
its purely northern Irish membership and its lack of a trade union licence in the 
Republic - not underline the ITUC’s essentially alien, British character? The 
explanation for CIU silence would appear to be that at the time the affair was 
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unfolding the CIU had a bigger fish to fry.  As noted earlier, having the CIU/FUE 
team and that of the ITUC travel to the USA at the same time so that programme 
arrangements could create opportunities for both sets of trade unionists to take part in 
joint activities with employers was central to Irish and US governmental thinking 
from the time the two project approach was adopted. During November 1951 such 
plans fell apart completely. By the middle of that month a six-member CIU group had 
arrived in the USA without the FUE nominees that were to make up the remainder of 
the TA Project 44-93 team. Shortly afterwards a four-strong FUE group travelled 
separately to join in a very large (300 plus) European industrialists’ mission. Given 
McAteer’s experience, a certain irony attaches to this visit’s organisation: 
 
The scheme on which four members of the FUE have recently departed was 
originally conceived as a joint European Mission under the auspices of OEEC. 
Exception was taken by some of the leading European manufacturers to the fact 
that, if this went forward as a formal TA scheme, they would be obliged to 
submit biographical data and to be cleared by US Security Authorities. 
Accordingly, a different method was found. The National Association of 
Manufacturers of the USA agreed to sponsor the scheme and indeed it was they 
who suggested (if they did not actually select) the names of the delegates from 
each particular country. ECA is, however, involved to the extent that they have 
undertaken to pay the dollar costs of the team of European employers for a 
period of 14 days, after which the team will be taken over by the National 
Association of Manufacturers.
xxviii
 
 
While the CIU team members did have to supply biographical details and obtain visa 
approval, what they shared with the employers’ group was having a sponsor that 
enabled them to by-pass the usual TA project procedures: 
 
This visit was originally intended as part of a joint employer/employee TA 
Mission in which the TUC and the FUE would also participate. Formal approval 
from ECA was held up because of the difficulty arising from the inclusion of 
Mr. McAteer in the TUC team. As a result, it was decided in October that the 
whole scheme should be deferred until the New Year and the three parties 
concerned were advised accordingly. ECA believed that after the meeting at 
which this was conveyed to them the CIU got in touch direct with Mr. Tobin, 
US Secretary of Labour, as a result of which their particular trip was approved 
out of turn as a separate project. The result has been, of course, to alter the 
whole concept of the project but ECA, Dublin, wanted us to understand that this 
had not been their doing and that they had to act on the instructions they got 
from Washington.
xxix
   
 
The debacle of these twin TA projects involving joint employer and trade union action 
proved a harbinger of the fate of the wider TA programme of which they formed part. 
At the end of December 1951 ECA was replaced by the Mutual Security Agency 
(MSA). The legislation that created MSA changed the context of US aid provision from 
European economic recovery to strengthening `the mutual security and individual 
and collective defences of the free world’. Crucially its terms required the Irish 
Government to explicitly adhere to the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 - which 
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provided the framework for its ongoing aid programme - `as heretofore amended, 
including the statement of purpose contained in Section 2 of the Mutual Security Act 
of 1951’. This was deemed to be incompatible with Ireland’s declared foreign policy 
and a Memorandum to the Government advised that should refusal to adhere `entail 
the discontinuance of all further American aid to this country after the 31st 
December, 1951, the Minister for External Affairs considers there is no alternative but 
to accept the loss involved.’ The extent of the loss became clear in the middle of 
January 1952 with MSA deciding that `the only rule that would fully meet their 
responsibilities under the legislation was that all assistance should be terminated as 
of midnight on the 8th January except to the extent necessary to relieve a 
government of a dollar commitment which they had entered into by firm contract 
and to which they were irrevocably committed’. Almost all the Irish TA projects had 
yet to reach this stage of irrevocable commitment and of just under $900,000 
authorised for Irish TA projects, only a little over $20,000 was to be expended after 
the aid suspension. Responsible for almost all the suspended projects, Industry and 
Commerce undertook a review whose recommendations were approved at the 
Departmental Conference held on 10 March 1952.  Of the projects deprived of any 
dollar support about half were continued to a greater or lesser extent by Irish 
Government funding while half were entirely discontinued (Murray 2009: 32-34 and 
49-51). The ITUC team visit was one of the survivors of this cull and, after further 
trials and tribulations that fall outside the scope of this paper, the five remaining 
nominees of August 1951 finally arrived in the USA in May 1952.  
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Conclusion 
Terry Cradden (1993: 212) identified as the three factors at work in the refusal of a US 
visa to John McAteer that `first, that he was a known left-winger; second, that he 
was not a `national’ of the country sending the mission; and third, that Stormont had 
intervened against his application’. In relation to the first factor what is noteworthy 
is how efforts on the part of ITUC leaders to avert damaging publicity both for the 
organisation as a whole and for McAteer personally resulted in press stories that 
stressed political credentials of McAteer’s that were broadly nationalist and anti-
partitionist in nature – his adherence to the Irish Labour Party rather than to the 
unionist-with-a-small-u Northern Ireland Labour Party, his involvement in organising 
1798 anniversary celebrations in Belfast and in seeking clemency for IRA activists 
from that city under sentence of death  – rather than specifically left-wing. It was 
these stories that pointed the finger towards Stormont as the source of McAteer’s 
difficulties with the American authorities and no evidence that Northern Irish 
governmental action played any role in the affair can be found in the files available in 
the Irish National Archives.  Motive for suggesting that McAteer had a `derogatory’ 
record can certainly be attributed to Stormont agencies but Belfast-based labour 
movement organisations to which he gave lengthy service were not above suspicion 
in other quarters. For instance, the Minutes of ITUC National Executive meeting of 26 
October – the day before the organisation received notification of the McAteer visa 
refusal - record that: 
A letter from the Belfast & District Trades Union Council enclosed copies of 
correspondence from the British T.U.C. to the Clerical and Administrative 
Workers Union and asked the National Executive to consider references to the  
Belfast & District Trades Union Council contained in that correspondence, in 
particular the statement that the Belfast & District Trades Union Council was 
Communist-controlled and the statement that the British T.U.C. was unable to 
say whether the Belfast & District Trades Union Council was acknowledged by 
the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Trade Union Congressxxx. 
Irish Communists had followed divergent northern and southern paths after Nazi 
Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. The following month a decision was 
taken to dissolve the Communist Party’s only southern branch in Dublin: members 
were to join the Labour Party with the ultimate aim of promoting its participation in a 
coalition that would secure a parliamentary majority for entering the war on the side 
of the United Nations. North of the border the Party remained intact and for a while 
prospered spectacularly, basking in the reflected glory of Red Army battlefield 
heroics, urging Labour-Unionist coalition at Stormont and demanding maximum 
factory output in support of the war effort. By 1951 these glory days were long gone 
but the party was not without influence. The successor to McAteer as Secretary of 
Belfast & District Trades Union Council who on 16 November communicated to 
Ruaidhri Roberts its view of the McAteer visa affair - `we can only believe that this 
refusal is conditioned by the fear of the American authorities to have such a champion 
of our class in the USA at the present time’xxxi - was the prominent Communist Betty 
Sinclair.   
The files available in Dublin confirm that not being a national of the country sending 
the mission was indeed a ground of objection to McAteer’s membership of the ITUC 
team. This was formally set out in the Office Memorandum presented to Frank Aiken 
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on 6 September and reproduced above. The External Affairs records of the 
discussions that took place on that date and on 8 September also confirm that there 
was a security dimension to the objection. While acknowledging the right of US 
authorities to exclude from their state whom they wished without statement of 
reasons, the Irish response very forcefully rejected the nationality ground set out in 
the US memorandum and questioned whether McAteer had a `derogatory’ record 
which might reasonably attract Congressional criticism on the basis of a contrary 
Garda assessment. No disclosure of the basis of the US security concerns with regard 
to McAteer was recorded on this occasion and the US authorities subsequently 
adhered to their intention to refuse McAteer a visa while accommodating Irish 
official sensitivity by leaving the grounds unspecified and the issue of nationality 
unstated. The Office Memorandum drew the US government into partition-related 
issues with which it normally sought to avoid any entanglement. With anti-partition 
campaigning being an activity in which Fianna Fail and the parties coalescing as a 
governmental alternative to it were vying to outdo one another, the idea that the 
position this memorandum set out could secure official understanding and 
appreciation in Dublin was scarcely better founded than the Irish government’s `sore 
thumb’ policy of raising the island’s partition at every opportunity on the 
international stage had been. Moreover the exclusive conception of nationality the 
memorandum asserted was at odds with the wider US policy emphasis of promoting 
civil and military cooperation across nation-state boundaries in non-communist 
Europe. As the December External Affairs Memorandum for the Government on the 
new US Mutual Security legislation observed:  `apart from the emphasis on military-
security, it will be noticed that the preamble to Section 101 (a) mentions as an object 
of the appropriations authorised by that section “to further encourage the economic 
unification and political federation of Europe”. This goes much further than any 
previous statement of the desire of the American legislature to see the creation of a 
unified Europe’xxxii. 
That the ITUC National Executive should be evenly split over how it should respond 
to the refusal of a US visa to one its TA team nominees principally reflected the 
complex and delicate state of its relationships with the Dublin and Stormont 
governments. In Dublin Marshall Aid was the first context within which Dublin 
governmental favouring of the CIU was replaced – to the chagrin of the CIU – with an 
even-handed treatment of the two congresses that would broaden into sustained 
official support for the recreation of a unified Irish trade union centre. Withdrawal 
from participation in the TA programme would have jeopardised this significant 
ITUC gain. North of the border the ITUC’s Northern Ireland Committee of which 
McAteer had been Secretary since its inception in 1945 sought in an incremental 
fashion to secure de facto recognition from Stormont as the representative body of 
trade unionists with which the Northern Ireland government should routinely confer. 
Initially this approach achieved some success – McAteer’s Tourist Board membership 
was on foot of a Northern Ireland Committee nomination – and it provides the context 
for the reference in the Minutes of the special ITUC National Executive meeting of 9 
November  to how `the Northern Ireland Committee had protested to the Northern 
Ireland Government against their “hand-picking” of Labour representatives’. With a 
hostile Minister of Labour as its principal architect, a general policy of Stormont 
government non-recognition would be instituted by 1953 and implemented for more 
than a decade but the NIC were able to secure the cooperation of individual unions 
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and broader union confederations in restricting, if not entirely preventing, labour 
representative `hand-picking’. This resulted in a stand-off which was ultimately 
resolved more by government capitulation than by trade union concession 
(Mulholland 1997).  
One of this stand-off’s casualties was the 1962 failure to establish in Northern Ireland 
a Productivity Council as part of a `National Productivity Year’ which was supposed 
to encompass the whole of the United Kingdom. South of the border a centre for the 
promotion of joint employer-trade union action was created with the establishment of 
the Irish National Productivity Committee in 1959, a decade after USTAP had been 
launched. When first preached the US `gospel of productivity’ had encountered too 
many deaf Irish ears to make a significant impact. But as both of the Irish states 
subsequently turned to economic planning to industrialise an agriculture-dependent 
economy or address problems of decline afflicting large, long-established engineering, 
shipbuilding and textile industries key parts of its joint action approach were to be 
rediscovered by Irish actors. Throughout both periods, and particularly on the ITUC 
side of the split, trade union leaders were to emerge as one of the Irish actor 
embodiments most receptive to the productivity message (Murray 2005 and 2009: 74-
96). The continued project participation plus protest formula adopted by the ITUC 
National Executive when John McAteer was refused a US visa was an early 
intimation of this disposition.  
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NOTES 
Abbreviations used in notes: 
NAI National Archives of Ireland 
DFA Department of Foreign Affairs 
DIC Department of Industry and Commerce 
DL Department of Labour 
DT  Department of the Taoiseach 
ICTU Irish Congress of Trade Unions 
  
 
                                                 
i
 See NAI DT S13,700 Congress of Irish Unions: uniformity of State action following 
recognition of 
ii NAI DFA A55 Communist Activities in Ireland “To The Editor” - a handwritten note on the 
two page document states “Report supplied Daily Papers but not published except brief note 
in Mail herewith” (attached is clipping from Evening Mail, “Workers League” 22/10/1948) 
iii
NAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and 
productivity: NAI DFA 305/57/112/28 Technical Assistance project no. 44/93, 44/94 
Central Council of Congress of Irish Unions application to send a team of trade 
unionists to the USA to study American industrial productivity and production 
methods etc. 
iv
See correspondence in NAI ICTU 2 440 (a) Team Visit to U.S. 1952   
v
 NAI ICTU Box 102 Irish Trade Union Congress  National Executive Minutes,  
Minutes of National Executive meeting 20/7/1951, Item 2754 E.C.A. Technical 
Assistance Team 
vi See correspondence in NAI ICTU 2 440 (a) Team Visit to U.S. 1952 
vii
 NAI ICTU Box 102 Irish Trade Union Congress Irish Trade Union Congress  
National Executive Minutes,  Minutes of National Executive meeting 10/8/1951, item 
2771 E.C.A. Mission  
viii
 NAI ICTU 2 440 (a) Team Visit to U.S. 1952 T. Waldron, Secretary, Dublin 
Trades Union Council to R. Roberts, Secretary, Irish Trade Union Congress 
28/8/1951, R. Roberts to T. Waldron 31/8/1951, hand-written draft reply of Roberts’ 
reply to Waldron undated  
ix NAI DFA Secretary’s Office P220 Mr. John McAteer, T.U.C. (ECA T.A. Programme) – United 
States Authorities Attitude Concerning, Office Memorandum September 4, 1951 Subject: 
John McAteer, I.T.U.C. Nominee for Labor T.A. Project 
x
 NAI DFA Secretary’s Office P220 Mr. John McAteer, T.U.C. (ECA T.A. Programme) – United 
States Authorities Attitude Concerning, Note concerning Minister’s conversations with U.S. 
Charge d’Affaires a.i., 4/6th September, 1952  re John McAteer, I.T.U.C. Nominee for E.C.A. 
T.A. Project: in the same file handwritten notes for the Minister that accompanied the draft 
of External Affairs note to correspond with American Embassy’s “office note”’ give a little 
more detail on the Dublin view of the security dimension of McAteer’s position – `Enquiries 
made concerning McAteer’s “ideology” elicited the view (of Asst. Comm. Carroll, G.S.) that 
he ought to be granted a passport because “for a number of years past he has not come 
unfavourably under notice by reason of open association with Communistic or “fellow-
traveller” organisations’ (underlining in original). 
xi NAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and productivity, 
Miss Brewster to Mr. McCarthy 6/9/1951 
xii NAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and 
productivity, Extract from Report of Department Conference  No. 220, 10/9/ 1951 
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xiii NAI ICTU 2 440 (a) Team Visit to U.S. 1952 R. Roberts, Secretary, Irish Trade Union 
Congress to R. Deasy, NUR 18/9/1951, Department of Industry and Commerce to R. Roberts 
25/9/1951 
xiv NAI DFA Secretary’s Office P220 Mr. John McAteer, T.U.C. (ECA T.A. Programme) – United 
States Authorities Attitude Concerning, re John McAteer, Irish Trade Union Congress. (Labor 
Technical Assistance Program. E.C.A.) 
xv NAI DFA 305/57/112/28 Technical Assistance project no. 44/93, 44/94 Central Council of 
Congress of Irish Unions application to send a team of trade unionists to the USA to study 
American industrial productivity and production methods etc.A.J. Dexter, Chief, ECA Mission 
to Ireland to T.  Commins, Department of External Affairs 18/10/1951 
xvi
 NAI ICTU Box 102Irish Trade Union Congress  National Executive Minutes,  Minutes of 
National Executive meeting  9/11/1951, Item 2847 E.C.A. Team 
xvii
 NAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and 
productivity,R. Roberts, Secretary, Irish Trade Union Congress to Secretary,  Department of 
Industry and Commerce 9/11/1951 
xviii
 For this correspondence  see NAI ICTU 2 439 T.U.Mission to USA Protests 
Against Refusal of Visa to J. McAteer  
xix
 NAI ICTU Box 122 Irish Trade Union Congress Northern Ireland Committee 
Minutes 1950-1963, General Files 1953-1959, Northern Ireland Committee Minutes, 
Minutes of Northern Ireland Committee meeting 16/11/1951 Item 75 E.C.A. 
Technical Assistance Scheme – I.T.U.C. Team, NAI ICTU Box 102 Irish Trade 
Union Congress National Executive Minutes, Minutes of National Executive meeting 
30/11/1951 Item 2865 E.C.A Visit to U.S.A. 
xx “U.S. visa for T.U.C. official refused” Irish Times 10/11/1951 
xxi “TUC Officer refused entry to U.S.” Irish Press 10/11/1951, “TUV protest at U.S. visa 
refusal” Irish Press 12/11/1951 
xxii “Irish T.U.C. official denied U.S. visa” Sunday Independent 11/11/1951 
xxiii “McAteer exclusion T.U.C. will not send deputy”  Irish Press 17/11/1951 
xxiv “Protest against visa refusal” Irish Independent 17/11/1951 
xxv “TUC American tour may be called off” Irish Press 30/11/1951 
xxvi NAI ICTU Box 102 Irish Trade Union Congress National Executive Minutes, Minutes of 
National Executive meeting 30/11/1951 Item 2865 E.C.A Visit to U.S.A. 
xxviiNAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and 
productivity,  NAI DFA 305/57/112/28 Technical Assistance project no. 44/93, 44/94 Central 
Council of Congress of Irish Unions application to send a team of trade unionists to the USA 
to study American industrial productivity and production methods etc. 
xxviiixxviii NAI DL W117 E.C.A. Mission to the United States to study labour relations and 
productivity, Thomas Murray memorandum on meeting with Messrs. Dexter and Cavanaugh, 
ECA Mission to Ireland, on 16 November. OEEC is the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation, predecessor to today’s Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). It was created in 1948 to coordinate and integrate the various 
national aid programmes within the European Recovery Programme. It was a condition of 
receiving Marshall Aid that a recipient state became an OEEC member. 
xxix Ibid. In addition to the typed Memorandum on this 16 November meeting there is a 
handwritten note that refers to the personal relationship that existed between Maurice 
Tobin and Senator William McMullen of the ITGWU who was a member of the CIU team that 
visited the USA and suggests that Tobin’s action was prompted by McMullen. 
xxx NAI ICTU Box 102 Irish Trade Union Congress National Executive Minutes, Minutes of 
National Executive meeting 26/10/1951 Item 2831 Belfast & District Trade Union Council 
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xxxi
 NAI ICTU 2 439 T.U. Mission to USA Protests Against Refusal of Visa to J. 
McAteer, B. Sinclair, Secretary, Belfast and District Trades’ Union Council  to R. 
Roberts, Secretary, Irish Trade Union Congress 16/11/195 
xxxii NAI DFA 305/57/275 The Mutual Security Act, 1951 (The Foreign Aid Bill), Memorandum 
to the Government “Enactment of Mutual Security Act by U.S. Congress – Demarche by 
American Ambassador”, 17 December 1951  
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